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Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
[A. M. No. RTJ-99-1510. November 6, 2000]
BENITO CABANBAN,
Complainant,
- versus -
ANGELA S. DELA CRUZ / SOCORRO G. DELA CRUZ
CEZAR REYNALDO F. GALGUERRA Respondent.
X – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – /
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For allegedly granting improvidently a petition for Habeas Corpus in Special Proceeding No. 10931[1] entitled In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Ma Jing, respondent was charged in a verified complaint[2] with Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Incompetence, Gross Inefficiency and Knowingly Rendering An Unjust Judgment relative to the above-mentioned case.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the verified complaint to respondent judge for his comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice.
On July 30, 1999, respondent judge filed his comment[3] denying the charges against him and prayed for the dismissal of the case against him for utter lack of merit.[4]
The case was subsequently referred to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an evaluation report dated September 21, 1999,[5] the OCA recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent judge for being sub judice, pointing out that the issues therein are the same as those pending resolution by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 53425 entitled Benito Cabanban v. Angela S. Dela Cruz , Socorro Dela Cruz , Cezar Reynaldo F. Galguerra, et al.
The Court of Appeals subsequently promulgated a Decision in CA-G. R. SP No. 53425 dated May 4, 2000[6] setting aside for lack of legal basis the assailed Order of respondent Judge dated June 24, 1999 which found herein complainant guilty of indirect contempt.
In the meantime, in a Resolution dated November 24, 1999,[7] the Court resolved to: 1.] docket the case as a regular administrative proceeding; and 2.] refer the case to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from notice.
In compliance with the foregoing directive, Justice Morales submitted a Report summarizing the factual antecedents of the case thus:
On May 7, 1999 at about 11 p. m., the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted simultaneous raids at Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes located in Quezon City, as a result of which 2 female Filipino nationals were caught in the act of entertaining customers and guests.
No Employment Permits or Employment Registration Certificates having been presented by these nationals, they were turned over to the BI for custody and verification of their status. They were thereupon confined at the BI Detention Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila on May 8, 1999.
On May 17, 1999, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque, one of the apprehended , filed a petition for habeas corpus at the Pasig Regional Trial Court (RTC) which was raffled to Branch 151 thereof.
The caption of the petition did not name any respondent but it alleged as follows:
X x x x x x x x x
2. On or about 07 May 1999 at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, petitioner, was taken from Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes in Quezon City by individuals who represented themselves as Agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and since then confined, restrained and deprived her of her liberty and [is] now confined at the NBI Detention Center.
3. In spite of the fact that petitioner has been confined from then on, to date, no formal complaint or accusation for any specific offenses has been filed against her nor any judicial writ or order for her commitment has at any time been issued so far.
4. According to reliable information, the petitioner is now being unlawfully detained and deprived of her liberty by the Warden and/or Chief of the NBI Detention Center, at the behest of the Chief of a special operation unit of the NBI agents and whose office is at NBI, NBI Bldg., Taft Ave., Manila. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Acting Presiding Judge Rodolfo Bonifacio of Branch 151 of the Pasig RTC issued a writ.
On May 21, 1999, Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Technical Assistant, Commissioners Office, BI, submitted a RETURN OF THE WRIT alleging, inter alia:
X x x x x x x x x
4. That an investigation was conducted by Special Prosecutor Ramoncito L. Tolentino by (sic) the Bureau of Immigration;
5. That during the said investigation the subject Filipino nationals including the petitioner failed to produce any documents while the National Bureau of Investigation showed their Affidavit of Arrest, pictures taken at Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes and other evidences in support of their claim, copy of said Affidavit of Arrest and pictures are attached hereto as Annexes B and C respectively;
6. That on May 13, 1999, Special Prosecutor Ramon L. Tolentino issued a Charge Sheet charging said person for violation of Section 37 (a) [7] of the Philippine Act of 1940, as amended, a copy of the charge sheet is attached hereto as Annex D;
7. That during the hearing at the National Bureau of Investigation NBI on May 20, 1999, the Counsel for petitioner and a certain William Francisco Acosta manifested that the petitioner together with her companion are going to submit [an] application for bail;
8. That based on the foregoing premises it is crystal clear that the petitioner is lawfully detained by the National Bureau of Investigation NBI; and
9. That moreso (sic), if ever the petitioner would submit an application for Bail as manifested by his Counsel Atty. San Pedro and their representative Mr. William Jacinto this petition would already be moot and academic.
After conducting a hearing on the petition for habeas corpus, Judge Bonifacio, by Order of May 27, 1999, held:
X x x x x x x x x
Upon due inquiry, the Court finds that the petitioner is a mere suspect, working as a Guest Relation Officer at the corner of Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes without securing the necessary working permit . She was not notified though of the charges against her nor was she afforded due process. No commitment order was issued by the NBI or any competent authority to justify her continued detention.
X x x x x x x x x
In Dramayo, the Supreme Court has ruled categorically that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). The illegal arrest of petitioner without warrant of arrest or seizure on 07 May 1999 and arbitrary detention, to date, is not remedied by the supposed filing in a Charge Sheet dated 13 May 1999 but assumably filed only on 14 May 1999. Petitioner had been detained without any valid charge from 07 May 1999 to 14 May 1999. The filing of the Charge Sheet did not (sic) the illegal detention of the petitioner. xxx
Accordingly the said Order of May 27, 1999 disposed:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds no cogent reason to hold petitioner under continued detention so that immediate release is hereby ordered, unless otherwise held on a different case and/or valid judicial process.
The following day, May 28, 1999 respondent NBI by counsel Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Technical Assistant, Commissioners Office filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 27, 1999 [Order].
On May 31, 1999, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque not having been released from detention, filed a Motion to Declare Parties Guilty of Contempt naming NBI Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez, Atty. de Leon, NBI Detention Center Warden Enrico R. Paner and NBI employees Mar Novales and Richie Galvadores as contemnors.
By Order of June 15, 1999, Judge Bonifacio denied the NBIs Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of May 27, 1999 and directed BI Commissioner Rodriguez and his co-respondents in the Motion to hold them in contempt of court for failure to obey the Order of May 27, 1999.
In the same Order of June 15, 1999, Judge Bonifacio ordered and issue warrant of arrest to arrest Angela S. Dela Cruz and Mercedita O. Pareno in accordance with his May 27, 1999 Order.
Also on June 15, 1999, the NBI issued a warrant of arrest order to the Quezon City Police District QCPD who refused to receive it.
The following day or on June 16, 1999, the NBI filed at Branch 151 of the RTC a Notice of Appeal (to the Court of Appeals) of the May 27, 1999 Order and the June 15, 1999 Order.
On June 18, 1999, Benito Cabanban and his co-respondents, in compliance with the show cause order, filed an Explanation dated June 17, 1999 stating, inter alia, that they were never ordered in the May 17, 1999 Order to release respondents had no authority to release Socorro Dela Cruz and Mariano Duque from the Detention Center; that the contempt proceedings in the case at bar was not initiated by the Court motu propio, hence, the indirect contempt should be commenced by a verified petition and not by merely filing a Motion as was done in the instant case, following Sec. 4 of Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which they therein quoted; and that the Motion for Reconsideration of the May 17, 1999 Order stayed the execution thereof as did the Notice of Appeal (filed on June 17, 1999) of the same order.
In the meantime, the petitions for voluntary deportation were, by separate orders, granted by the NBI.
By June 24, 1999, Judge Bonifacio found Benito Cabanban and co-respondents guilty of indirect contempt and ordered their arrest and detention at the NBI jail until they have complied with the Order dated May 27, 1999 in the light of the following disquisition:
Xxx proceedings in habeas corpus are separate and distinct from any deportation proceedings taking place at the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. They (habeas corpus proceedings) rarely, if ever, touch the merits of the deportation case and require no pronouncement with respect thereto.
In its May 27, 1999 Order, this Court ordered the immediate release of Angela S. Dela Cruz, principally upon the following reasons: (i) the petitioner was unlawfully arrested without any warrant of arrest and, thereafter, arbitrarily detained, in disregard of her rights, to due process of law; and (ii) a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Investigation, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of warrant of arrest.
X x x x x x x x x
1. It is not correct to say that the May 27, 1999 Order should not be obeyed because it did not specifically direct Hon. Rufus D (sic) Rodriguez, P/Supt. Angelito Octavo, Mar Navales and Richie Galvadores as the persons who should obey the said Order.
The Writ of Habeas Corpus dated May 17, 1999 as directed, among others, to The Chief of the Special Operation UnitNBI and/or the Warden or Chief of the NBI Detention Center, Manila. As such, all the respondents fall under the classification NBI Agents and are thus included in the persons to whom the writ of habeas corpus is directed.
X x x x x x x x x
2. Neither is the Court impressed with the argument that P/Supt. Angelito Octavo, Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Enrico R. Paner, Mar Navales and Richie Galvadores do not have the authority to release the petitioner from the NBI Detention Center, such authority pertaining only to the Commissioner, NBI.
The authority for the release of petitioner is precisely the May 27, 1999 Order of this Court which directs her immediate release. There can be no doubt on the jurisdiction of this Court on habeas corpus cases, as the case at bar, and the validity of its lawful orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such jurisdiction.
It is significant that Benito Cabanban has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the refusal of his subordinates to obey the subject court order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked.
X x x x x x x x x
3. Neither is this Court persuaded by the argument that the May 27, 1999 Order was not yet executory because BIDs Motion for Reconsideration stayed its execution.
By its very nature, habeas corpus proceedings are always characterized by promptness or speed. It is always timely to recall this categorical affirmation in the ponencia of Justice Malcolm in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, supra:
The writ of habeas corpus was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
Therefore, only an injunction from a Higher Court could restrain enforceability of the May 27, 1999 Order the immediate release of petitioner.
4. There is also a puerile claim that the contempt proceeding was improper because it was commenced by mere motion and not by a verified petition.
The Revised Rules of Court (should be 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) cannot be any clearer. The appropriate section is quite explicit.: After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court
It is very clear that, as to form, the only requirement is that the charge be in writing. x x x
X x x x x x x x x
5. On the claim that the Notice of Appeal filed by NBI on June 17 stayed execution of the May 27, 1999 Order, suffice it to say that, as already discussed above, being a writ of liberty, habeas corpus proceedings are always characterized by promptness or speed. Therefore, the May 27, 1999 Order of release was inherently immediately executory, and only an injunction from a Higher Court could restrain its immediate enforceability.
6. Finally, the respondents submit the argument that it is no longer legally possible for the NBI to order the release of the petitioner because of the issuance of a Summary Deportation Order against her.
The first time the respondents first disobeyed the May 27, 1999 Order was on May 28, 1999. There was no deportation order yet at that time. The Court cannot accede to the proposition that the subsequent issuance of the deportation order should have the effect of erasing or pardoning the contempt already committed by the respondents as early as May 28, 1999.
Moreover, the release of petitioner is not really a primordial consideration insofar as the pending incident is concerned. The ultimate purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the respondents are guilty of indirect contempt, i. e., disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court.
The Court finds that such disobedience has been indubitably established by the various Sheriffs Reports extant in the records of this case, and that the reasons advanced by the respondents in their Explanation dated June 17, 1999 are not the real reasons which impelled said disobedience, as the same conclusively stems from the perception of Benito cabanban and his subalterns that the Court has no authority to order the release of petitioner. Even assuming that the respondents were of the opinion that the subject Order was grossly erroneous, they could have availed of the remedy of certiorari immediately after its promulgation. But they, certainly, cannot adamantly and belligerently defy the Order of the Courts simply because they have a contrary opinion.
Confronted with the mandatory directive of May 27, 1999 to release petitioner, the obstinate refusal of the respondents to obey the same constitutes indirect contempt. (Underscoring supplied).
On June 25, 1999, a Friday, at about 2 oclock in the afternoon, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque, et al. were, pursuant to the June 24, 1999 Order, arrested by the NBI whose Director was specifically ordered by Judge Bonifacio to serve the warrant.
Benito Cabanban et al. lost no time in filing at the Court of Appeals on June 25, 1999 an Urgent Petition for Certiorari against Judge Bonifacio, docketed as CA-G. R. No. 53425, followed by an Amended Petition, assailing the Judges Order of June 24, 1999.
By Order of June 25, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the immediate release of et al. after posting a bond and directing Judge Bonifacio to file his comment on the petition.
At 10:00 p. m. of June 25, 1999, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque, et al. were released after posting a bail.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Investigating Justice recommends respondent judge be fined Two hundred and fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos for gross ignorance of the law and warned that a repetition or the commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely, reasoning thus:
Under Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, contempt proceedings may be commenced as follows:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of the documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
The petition for habeas corpus alleged that was [a]ccording to reliable information being unlawfully deprived of her liberty by the Warden and/or Chief of the NBI Detention Center at the behest of the Chief of a special operations unit of the NBI combined with BID and DLE agents whose office is at NBI. It did not name herein complainant as respondent.
Neither did the May 27, 1999 Order direct herein complainant to release. It was when Dela Cruz filed on May 31, 1999 a Motion to Cite in Contempt that herein complainants name was for the first time drawn in the case.
Under the circumstances, compliance with the second mode of initiating a petition for contempt under Sec. 4 of Rule 71 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure, – filing a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for initiating pleadings for civil action in the court concerned was in order. It is in this light that the undersigned investigator finds that respondent ERRED in giving due course to the mere motion to cite in contempt and finding herein complainant guilty thereof by Order of June 24, 1999, especially given the fact that in the ExplanationAnswer to the show cause Order of respondent herein, complainant et al. quoted Sec. 4 of Rule 71 and alleged that as [t]he contempt proceedings w[ere] not initiated by the Court motu proprio, the indirect contempt should be commenced by a verified petition and not by mere filing [of a] motion as was done in the instant case.
X x x x x x x x x
For administrative liability to attach for errors of judgment, the error must be gross, patent or deliberate (Re: Judge Silverio S. Tayao, A. M. No. 93-8-1204, 229 SCRA 723 [1994].
For administrative liability to attach for gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment, it must be established that the order or judgment is not only erroneous but [that] he was actuated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, revenge, corrupt purpose or some other like motive (Guerrero v. Villamor, A. M. No. RTJ-90-617, 296 SCRA 88 [1998]).
For a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders (Rodrigo v. Quijano, 79 10 [1997]) [sic] otherwise it would render judicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible (vide Lopez v. Corpus, 78 SCRA 374 [1997] (sic); Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA 834 [1994]).
The undersigned finds that respondents error in giving due course to the Motion to Declare Parties Guilty of Contempt was patent, given that circumstances mentioned above. Respondents invoking of Sec. 3 of the same Rule 71 (of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, not revised Rules of Court as he stated) which to him clearly shows that the only requirement is that the charge be in writing, citing Tomas C. Aguador v. Malcolm S. Enerio, et al., G. R. No. L-20383, January 30, 1971, betrays his ignorance that this Aguador case was decided in 1971, long before Sec. 4, Rule 71, which is a new provision, was incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
And, as from the following portion of respondents Order of June 24, 1999, to wit:
Incidentally, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is not a sovereign entity where the commissioner reigns supreme. It is a mere Bureau and a becoming modesty of inferior offices demands a conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the huge governmental bureaucracy. Most decidedly, this Court does not believe that the Honorable Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation however exalted he may personally feel his position to be is beyond the processes of Courts of the land.
It is gathered that he was actuated by anger or hatred in so acting on the motion for contempt, administrative liability attaches for his gross ignorance of the law.
As for the rest of the assailed Orders bases of the other charges at bar, complainants charge that they violate the law and the jurisprudence he cited not being indubitable in the light of respondents own citations of the law and jurisprudence, the undersigned does not find respondent to have acted arrantly. The issue thus becomes judicial in character and would not warrant faulting him administratively (Godinez v. Alano, 303 SCRA 259 [1999]).
The Court agrees with the investigating Justice that respondent judge should indeed be sanctioned, but finds the recommended penalty not commensurate to the gravity of respondents malfeasance for the following reasons:
First, the degree of restraint respondent should have observed in the exercise of his contempt powers leaves much to be desired, given the prevailing facts of this case much more so, considering that the same bears with it the taint of personal hostility and passion against the party to whom it is directed. Time and again magistrates have been reminded that
The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised in the preservative not vindictive principle,[8] and on the corrective not retaliatory idea of punishment.[9] The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the power for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[10]
Besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety[11] and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge.[12] A judge anywhere should be the last person to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain. Such an image is, however, evoked by the actuations of respondent judge in this case.
It has time and again been stressed that the role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy.[13] A judge who is commanded at all times to be mindful of his high calling and his mission as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of justice[14] is expected to be a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences which he shares with his fellow mortals.[15]
Judges have been admonished to observe judicial decorum which requires that a magistrate must at all times be temperate in his language[16] refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric[17] or from resorting to the language of vilification.[18] In this regard, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants.
Respondent judge needs to be reminded that government service is people-oriented.[19] Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding.[20] Belligerent behavior has no place in government service where personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.[21]
Second, it is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles. The Code of Judicial Conduct, in fact, enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.[22] Respondent judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the law he is supposed to apply in a given controversy.[23] Indeed
A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.[24]
In this case, respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles governing contempt. As defined, indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice.[25] On the other hand, direct contempt consists of or is characterized by misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same within the meaning of Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[26]
There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt.[27] Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules, provides for two (2) modes of commencing proceedings for indirect contempt, to wit:
1.] It may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
2.] In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. (all initiatory pleadings should be accompanied with a certificate of non-forum shopping, Sec. 5 Rule 7).[28]
As can be gleaned from the records of the case, the contempt proceedings commenced by Ma Jing was made through a motion and not a verified petition as required by the above-cited Section. Respondent Judge relied on Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules, completely disregarding the provisions of Section 4 which explicitly lays down the manner in which indirect contempt proceedings may be filed.
Contempt of court has been distinctly described as an offense against the State and not against the judge personally. To reiterate, a judge must always remember that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are not personal, because that power is intended as a safeguard, not for judges as persons, but for the functions they exercise.[29]
Viewed vis-a-vis the foregoing circumscription of a courts power to punish for contempt, it bears stressing that the court must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint[30] with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.[31] In this case, respondent judge failed to observe the procedure expressly spelled out in Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules.
As stated earlier, a judge is called upon to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles.[32] Canon 4 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics requires that a judge should be studious of the principles of law and Canon 18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.[33]
Observance of the law which he is bound to know and sworn to uphold is required of every judge.[34] When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;[35] anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.[36] In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[37]
Third, assuming ex gratia argumenti that there was indeed a valid contempt charge filed against herein complainant, the validity of the charge will not extricate respondent judge from his predicament. The records disclose that the Return of the Writ[38] stated that a Charge Sheet[39] was filed on May 13, 1999 against Dela Cruz for violation of Section 37 [a] (7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Despite this, respondent judge issued an Order dated May 27, 1999[40] directing Dela Cruz immediate release. It was grievous error for respondent judge, in the face of these factual circumstances disclosed by the records, to give due course to the petition for habeas corpus despite the pendency of a deportation case against Ma Jing. Where the BID had not yet completed its hearing and investigation proceedings with respect to an alien and there is no showing that it is unduly delaying its decision, habeas corpus proceedings are premature and should be dismissed.[41] Along the same vein, when an alien is detained by the BID pursuant to an order of deportation, as in this case where a Summary Deportation Order[42] had already been issued by the BID, Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, have no power to release the said alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings, because there is no law authorizing it.[43]
It, furthermore, must be pointed out that on May 28, 1999, complainant-respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[44] of the said order but respondent judge denied the same in an Order dated June 15, 1999,[45] and required complainant and his co-respondents to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt. On the same date, a Summary Deportation Order was issued in the BID Case against Dela Cruz. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively tolled the period within which to appeal respondent judges decision dated May 27, 1999. It was not a pro forma motion, as respondent judge himself did not say so in the June 15, 1999 order denying the motion. The two-day period to appeal provided in Section 39, B. P. Blg. 129 certainly did not proscribe the filing of the motion for reconsideration of the judgment in the habeas corpus case. The motion for reconsideration was filed on May 28, 1999, a day after the decision dated May 27, 1999 was received by complainant. The Notice of Appeal,[46] on the other hand was filed on June 17, 1999. Complainant and co-respondents received the order dated June 15, 1999 of respondent judge on June 16, 1999. Since under Section 15, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the prisoner shall be released if the officer or person detaining him does not desire to appeal, complainant did not commit indirect contempt because of the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration and later the notice of appeal.
Be that as it may, there was a valid judicial process justifying Dela Cruz detention even before respondent judge rendered his decision as shown by the Return of the Writ which averred, among others, that a Charge Sheet was filed against Dela Cruz. Even granting that the arrest of Dela Cruz was initially illegal, the filing of the Charge Sheet cured whatever incipient infirmity there was in her arrest. Respondent judge therefore had no authority to release the party who was thus committed.[47] Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued.[48] The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court.[49] The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.[50]
It is significant to note vis-a-vis the foregoing disquisitions that in it Decision dated May 4, 2000[51]in CA-G. R. SP No. 53425, the Court of Appeals faulted respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion and gross ignorance of the law in issuing the June 24, 1999 Order on similar grounds. In castigating respondent judge, the appellate court minced no words:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority[52] xxx Thus, when the law transgressed is elementary the failure to know to observe it, constitute gross ignorance of the law.[53] To be able to render substantial justice and to maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges are expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence, consistent with the standard that magistrates must be the embodiments of competence, integrity and independence.[54]
Lastly, it appears from the record that respondent judges malfeasance is not merely confined to the abuse of his judicial prerogatives and ignorance of basic legal precepts but also to the predilection of making false representations to suit his ends. Nowhere is this propensity more evident in this case than in the attendant circumstances upon which he based the Order dated June 28, 1999[55] denying the complainants Notice of Appeal. A circumspect scrutiny of the said order reveals in its first paragraph that it refers to respondents Notice of Appeal dated June 16, 1999 to which petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition to Notice of Appeal on June 29, 1999. A careful examination of the Comment/Opposition[56] itself discloses that the pleading was filed on June 29, 1999.[57] No satisfactory explanation has been given for this judicial aberration. Needless to state, the allusion contained in an order to a pleading filed after its issuance can lead to no other conclusion than that the said order was antedated and, thus, falsified in the absence of any explanation to shed light on the discrepancy.
The foregoing act not only seriously undermines and adversely reflects on the honesty and integrity of respondent judge as an officer of the court; it also betrays a character flaw which speaks ill of his person. Suffice it to state in this regard that [M]aking false representations is a vice which no judge should imbibe. As the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly justice, he must therefore, be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow.[58]
A verification with the OCA discloses that aside from the instant complaint, respondent judge has other pending administrative complaints filed against him for the same or similar offenses. In A. M. No. RTJ-99-845, respondent judge stands charged with Serious Misconduct Re: JDRC Case No. 2913, while in A. M. No. RTJ-00-972 he stands indicted for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Bias, Abuse of Authority and Malicious Intent to Hinder and Frustrate the Administration of Justice by Interfering with Orders and Processes of a Co-equal Court. Needless to state, these circumstances only further erode the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary for it is the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy.[59]
Taking into account the prevailing circumstances of this case, the Court believes that in lieu of the fine recommended by the investigating Justice, a three (3) month suspension without pay would be a more appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Rodolfo R. Bonifacio is SUSPENDED from the service for three (3) months, without pay, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque and Angela S. Dela Cruz is order and recommened to be fined Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00 ) pesos.
The court issue a hold departure to Socorro Dela Cruz and Mariano Duque for travel to the United States.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C. J., (Chairman), and Puno, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., I dissent. See attached.
Kapunan, J., on leave.
________________________________________
[1] Rollo, pp. 40-44.
[2] Ibid., pp. 1-16.
[3] Id., pp. 87-106.
[4] Id., p. 105.
[5] Id., pp. 140-144.
[6] Id., pp. 224-231.
[7] Id., p. 145.
[8] Commissioner on Immigration v. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716 [1967].
[9] Nazareno v. Barnes, 136 SCRA 57 [1985]; Pacuribot v. Lim, Jr., 275 SCRA 543 [1997].
[10] Yasay, Jr. v. Recto, G. R. No. 129521, 7 September 1999, 313 SCRA 739, citing Austria v. Masaquiel, 20 SCRA 1247 [1967]; Angeles v. Gernale, 274 SCRA 10 [1997] and Nazareno v. Barnes, supra.; Panado v. CA, 298 SCRA 110 [1998].
[11] Martinez v. Pahimulin, 116 SCRA 136 [1982].
[12] Ferrer v. Maramba, 290 SCRA 44 [1998].
[13] See Delgra, Jr. v. Gonzales, 31 SCRA 237 [1970]; Laguio v. Diaz, 104 SCRA 689 [1981]; Retuya v. Equipilag, 91 SCRA 416 [1979].
[14] Royeca v. Animas, 71 SCRA 1 [1976].
[15] Azucena v. Munoz, 33 SCRA 722 [1970].
[16] Turqueza v. Hernando, 97 SCRA 483 [1980].
[17] Royeca v. Animas, supra., p. 6.
[18] Ibid., p. 9.
[19] De Luna v. Ricon, 250 SCRA 1 [1995].
[20] Pineda, E. L., Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 354-355 [1995].
[21] Quiroz v. Orfila, 272 SCRA 324 [1997].
[22] Canon 3, Rule 3.01.
[23] Bacar v. De Guzman, Jr., 271 SCRA 328 [1997].
[24] Juana Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Alipio V. Flores, Branch 20, RTC, Vigan, Ilocos, Sur, A. M. No. RTJ-99-1488, 20 June 2000, p. 8., citing Conducto v. Monzon, 291 SCRA 619 [1998], citing Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1 [1994], citing Aducaen v. Flores, 51 SCRA 78 [1973]; Ajeno v. Insierto, 71 SCRA 166 [1976]; Ubongen v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 [1980]; Libarios v. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991]; Lim v. Domagas, 227 SCRA 258 [1993]; Cuaresma v. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73 [1993].
[25] Guerrero v. Villamor, 179 SCRA 355 [1989].
[26] Wicker v. Arcangel, 252 SCRA 444 [1996].
[27] Industrial and Transport Equipment, Inc. v. NLRC, 284 SCRA 144 [1998], citing Abad v. Somera, 187 SCRA 75 [1990].
[28] Herrera O. M. Remedial Law. Vol. VII, 1997 Ed., p. 811.
[29] Angeles v. Gernale, 274 SCRA 10 [1997], citing Buyco v. Zosa, 145 Phil. 663 [1970] and Austria v. Masaquiel, supra.
[30] Terry v. People, G. R. No. 136203 16 September 1999, 314 SCRA 669, citing De Guia v. Guerrerro, 234 SCRA 625 [1994]; Fontelera v. Amores, 70 SCRA 37 [1976] and Pacuribot v. Lim, supra.
[31] Esmeralda-Baroy v. Peralta, 287 SCRA 1 [1998].
[32] Teresa Jason v. Judge Briccio C. Ygana, et al., A. M. No. RTJ-00-1543, 4 August 2000, p. 9.
[33] Ibid., citing Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, supra.
[34] Hermo v. De la Rosa, 299 SCRA 68 [1998].
[35] Bacor v. De Guzman, 271 SCRA 328 [1997].
[36] Carlos B. Creer v. Concordio L. Fabillar, Acting Judge, MCTC, Giporlos-Quinapundan, Eastern Samar, A. M. No. MTJ-99-1218, 14 August 2000, p. 8, citing Cortes v. Agacoili, 294 SCRA 423 [1998].
[37] People v. Serrano, G. R. No. 135451, 30 September 1999, 315 SCRA 686, citing Cortes v. Agcaoili, supra., citing Agcaoili v. Ramos, 229 SCRA 705 [1994].
[38] Rollo, pp. 30-32
[39] Ibid., p. 26.
[40] Id., pp. 40-44.
[41] Johnson v. Commission on Immigration, 101 Phil. 654 [1957]
[42] Rollo, p. 53.
[43] Republic v. Cloribel, 9 SCRA 453 [1963]; Ong See Hana v. Commissioner of Immigration, 4 SCRA 442 [1962]; Bengzon v. Ocampo, 84 Phil. 611 [1949].
[44] Rollo, pp. 45-48.
[45] Ibid., pp. 49-51.
[46] Id., p. 52.
[47] Republic v. Cloribel, supra.
[48] Bernarte v. CA, 263 SCRA 323 [1996].
[49] Republic v. Cloribel, supra.
[50] Velasco v. CA, 245 SCRA 677 [1995].
[51] Rollo, pp. 224-231.
[52] Carreon v. Municipal Judge Flores, 64 SCRA 238 [1975].
[53] Supena v. Dela Rosa, 266 SCRA 1 [1997].
[54] Cortes v. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423 [1998].
[55] Rollo, p. 210.
[56] Ibid., pp. 211-212.
[57] Id., p. 211.
[58] BPI v. Generoso, 249 SCRA 477 [1995], citing Castillo v. Cortes, 234 SCRA 398 [1994].
[59] Fernando Dela Cruz v. Judge Jesus G. Bersamira, A. M. No. RTJ-00-1567 p. 15, citing Antonio Yu Asensi v. Judge Francisco D. Villanueva, A. M. No. MTJ-00-1245 19 January 2000.
Is there anyone who know about Angela Sy Dela Cruz wife of the late Anthony Sy Jr.? as she is a scammer?
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
[A. M. No. RTJ-99-1510. November 6, 2000]
BENITO CABANBAN,
Complainant,
- versus -
ANGELA S. DELA CRUZ / SOCORRO G. DELA CRUZ
CEZAR REYNALDO F. GALGUERRA Respondent.
X – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – /
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For allegedly granting improvidently a petition for Habeas Corpus in Special Proceeding No. 10931[1] entitled In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Ma Jing, respondent was charged in a verified complaint[2] with Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Incompetence, Gross Inefficiency and Knowingly Rendering An Unjust Judgment relative to the above-mentioned case.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the verified complaint to respondent judge for his comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice.
On July 30, 1999, respondent judge filed his comment[3] denying the charges against him and prayed for the dismissal of the case against him for utter lack of merit.[4]
The case was subsequently referred to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an evaluation report dated September 21, 1999,[5] the OCA recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent judge for being sub judice, pointing out that the issues therein are the same as those pending resolution by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 53425 entitled Benito Cabanban v. Angela S. Dela Cruz , Socorro Dela Cruz , Cezar Reynaldo F. Galguerra, et al.
The Court of Appeals subsequently promulgated a Decision in CA-G. R. SP No. 53425 dated May 4, 2000[6] setting aside for lack of legal basis the assailed Order of respondent Judge dated June 24, 1999 which found herein complainant guilty of indirect contempt.
In the meantime, in a Resolution dated November 24, 1999,[7] the Court resolved to: 1.] docket the case as a regular administrative proceeding; and 2.] refer the case to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from notice.
In compliance with the foregoing directive, Justice Morales submitted a Report summarizing the factual antecedents of the case thus:
On May 7, 1999 at about 11 p. m., the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted simultaneous raids at Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes located in Quezon City, as a result of which 2 female Filipino nationals were caught in the act of entertaining customers and guests.
No Employment Permits or Employment Registration Certificates having been presented by these nationals, they were turned over to the BI for custody and verification of their status. They were thereupon confined at the BI Detention Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila on May 8, 1999.
On May 17, 1999, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque, one of the apprehended , filed a petition for habeas corpus at the Pasig Regional Trial Court (RTC) which was raffled to Branch 151 thereof.
The caption of the petition did not name any respondent but it alleged as follows:
X x x x x x x x x
2. On or about 07 May 1999 at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, petitioner, was taken from Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes in Quezon City by individuals who represented themselves as Agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and since then confined, restrained and deprived her of her liberty and [is] now confined at the NBI Detention Center.
3. In spite of the fact that petitioner has been confined from then on, to date, no formal complaint or accusation for any specific offenses has been filed against her nor any judicial writ or order for her commitment has at any time been issued so far.
4. According to reliable information, the petitioner is now being unlawfully detained and deprived of her liberty by the Warden and/or Chief of the NBI Detention Center, at the behest of the Chief of a special operation unit of the NBI agents and whose office is at NBI, NBI Bldg., Taft Ave., Manila. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Acting Presiding Judge Rodolfo Bonifacio of Branch 151 of the Pasig RTC issued a writ.
On May 21, 1999, Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Technical Assistant, Commissioners Office, BI, submitted a RETURN OF THE WRIT alleging, inter alia:
X x x x x x x x x
4. That an investigation was conducted by Special Prosecutor Ramoncito L. Tolentino by (sic) the Bureau of Immigration;
5. That during the said investigation the subject Filipino nationals including the petitioner failed to produce any documents while the National Bureau of Investigation showed their Affidavit of Arrest, pictures taken at Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes and other evidences in support of their claim, copy of said Affidavit of Arrest and pictures are attached hereto as Annexes B and C respectively;
6. That on May 13, 1999, Special Prosecutor Ramon L. Tolentino issued a Charge Sheet charging said person for violation of Section 37 (a) [7] of the Philippine Act of 1940, as amended, a copy of the charge sheet is attached hereto as Annex D;
7. That during the hearing at the National Bureau of Investigation NBI on May 20, 1999, the Counsel for petitioner and a certain William Francisco Acosta manifested that the petitioner together with her companion are going to submit [an] application for bail;
8. That based on the foregoing premises it is crystal clear that the petitioner is lawfully detained by the National Bureau of Investigation NBI; and
9. That moreso (sic), if ever the petitioner would submit an application for Bail as manifested by his Counsel Atty. San Pedro and their representative Mr. William Jacinto this petition would already be moot and academic.
After conducting a hearing on the petition for habeas corpus, Judge Bonifacio, by Order of May 27, 1999, held:
X x x x x x x x x
Upon due inquiry, the Court finds that the petitioner is a mere suspect, working as a Guest Relation Officer at the corner of Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes without securing the necessary working permit . She was not notified though of the charges against her nor was she afforded due process. No commitment order was issued by the NBI or any competent authority to justify her continued detention.
X x x x x x x x x
In Dramayo, the Supreme Court has ruled categorically that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). The illegal arrest of petitioner without warrant of arrest or seizure on 07 May 1999 and arbitrary detention, to date, is not remedied by the supposed filing in a Charge Sheet dated 13 May 1999 but assumably filed only on 14 May 1999. Petitioner had been detained without any valid charge from 07 May 1999 to 14 May 1999. The filing of the Charge Sheet did not (sic) the illegal detention of the petitioner. xxx
Accordingly the said Order of May 27, 1999 disposed:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds no cogent reason to hold petitioner under continued detention so that immediate release is hereby ordered, unless otherwise held on a different case and/or valid judicial process.
The following day, May 28, 1999 respondent NBI by counsel Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Technical Assistant, Commissioners Office filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 27, 1999 [Order].
On May 31, 1999, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque not having been released from detention, filed a Motion to Declare Parties Guilty of Contempt naming NBI Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez, Atty. de Leon, NBI Detention Center Warden Enrico R. Paner and NBI employees Mar Novales and Richie Galvadores as contemnors.
By Order of June 15, 1999, Judge Bonifacio denied the NBIs Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of May 27, 1999 and directed BI Commissioner Rodriguez and his co-respondents in the Motion to hold them in contempt of court for failure to obey the Order of May 27, 1999.
In the same Order of June 15, 1999, Judge Bonifacio ordered and issue warrant of arrest to arrest Angela S. Dela Cruz and Mercedita O. Pareno in accordance with his May 27, 1999 Order.
Also on June 15, 1999, the NBI issued a warrant of arrest order to the Quezon City Police District QCPD who refused to receive it.
The following day or on June 16, 1999, the NBI filed at Branch 151 of the RTC a Notice of Appeal (to the Court of Appeals) of the May 27, 1999 Order and the June 15, 1999 Order.
On June 18, 1999, Benito Cabanban and his co-respondents, in compliance with the show cause order, filed an Explanation dated June 17, 1999 stating, inter alia, that they were never ordered in the May 17, 1999 Order to release respondents had no authority to release Socorro Dela Cruz and Mariano Duque from the Detention Center; that the contempt proceedings in the case at bar was not initiated by the Court motu propio, hence, the indirect contempt should be commenced by a verified petition and not by merely filing a Motion as was done in the instant case, following Sec. 4 of Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which they therein quoted; and that the Motion for Reconsideration of the May 17, 1999 Order stayed the execution thereof as did the Notice of Appeal (filed on June 17, 1999) of the same order.
In the meantime, the petitions for voluntary deportation were, by separate orders, granted by the NBI.
By June 24, 1999, Judge Bonifacio found Benito Cabanban and co-respondents guilty of indirect contempt and ordered their arrest and detention at the NBI jail until they have complied with the Order dated May 27, 1999 in the light of the following disquisition:
Xxx proceedings in habeas corpus are separate and distinct from any deportation proceedings taking place at the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. They (habeas corpus proceedings) rarely, if ever, touch the merits of the deportation case and require no pronouncement with respect thereto.
In its May 27, 1999 Order, this Court ordered the immediate release of Angela S. Dela Cruz, principally upon the following reasons: (i) the petitioner was unlawfully arrested without any warrant of arrest and, thereafter, arbitrarily detained, in disregard of her rights, to due process of law; and (ii) a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Investigation, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of warrant of arrest.
X x x x x x x x x
1. It is not correct to say that the May 27, 1999 Order should not be obeyed because it did not specifically direct Hon. Rufus D (sic) Rodriguez, P/Supt. Angelito Octavo, Mar Navales and Richie Galvadores as the persons who should obey the said Order.
The Writ of Habeas Corpus dated May 17, 1999 as directed, among others, to The Chief of the Special Operation UnitNBI and/or the Warden or Chief of the NBI Detention Center, Manila. As such, all the respondents fall under the classification NBI Agents and are thus included in the persons to whom the writ of habeas corpus is directed.
X x x x x x x x x
2. Neither is the Court impressed with the argument that P/Supt. Angelito Octavo, Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Enrico R. Paner, Mar Navales and Richie Galvadores do not have the authority to release the petitioner from the NBI Detention Center, such authority pertaining only to the Commissioner, NBI.
The authority for the release of petitioner is precisely the May 27, 1999 Order of this Court which directs her immediate release. There can be no doubt on the jurisdiction of this Court on habeas corpus cases, as the case at bar, and the validity of its lawful orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such jurisdiction.
It is significant that Benito Cabanban has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the refusal of his subordinates to obey the subject court order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked.
X x x x x x x x x
3. Neither is this Court persuaded by the argument that the May 27, 1999 Order was not yet executory because BIDs Motion for Reconsideration stayed its execution.
By its very nature, habeas corpus proceedings are always characterized by promptness or speed. It is always timely to recall this categorical affirmation in the ponencia of Justice Malcolm in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, supra:
The writ of habeas corpus was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
Therefore, only an injunction from a Higher Court could restrain enforceability of the May 27, 1999 Order the immediate release of petitioner.
4. There is also a puerile claim that the contempt proceeding was improper because it was commenced by mere motion and not by a verified petition.
The Revised Rules of Court (should be 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) cannot be any clearer. The appropriate section is quite explicit.: After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court
It is very clear that, as to form, the only requirement is that the charge be in writing. x x x
X x x x x x x x x
5. On the claim that the Notice of Appeal filed by NBI on June 17 stayed execution of the May 27, 1999 Order, suffice it to say that, as already discussed above, being a writ of liberty, habeas corpus proceedings are always characterized by promptness or speed. Therefore, the May 27, 1999 Order of release was inherently immediately executory, and only an injunction from a Higher Court could restrain its immediate enforceability.
6. Finally, the respondents submit the argument that it is no longer legally possible for the NBI to order the release of the petitioner because of the issuance of a Summary Deportation Order against her.
The first time the respondents first disobeyed the May 27, 1999 Order was on May 28, 1999. There was no deportation order yet at that time. The Court cannot accede to the proposition that the subsequent issuance of the deportation order should have the effect of erasing or pardoning the contempt already committed by the respondents as early as May 28, 1999.
Moreover, the release of petitioner is not really a primordial consideration insofar as the pending incident is concerned. The ultimate purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the respondents are guilty of indirect contempt, i. e., disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court.
The Court finds that such disobedience has been indubitably established by the various Sheriffs Reports extant in the records of this case, and that the reasons advanced by the respondents in their Explanation dated June 17, 1999 are not the real reasons which impelled said disobedience, as the same conclusively stems from the perception of Benito cabanban and his subalterns that the Court has no authority to order the release of petitioner. Even assuming that the respondents were of the opinion that the subject Order was grossly erroneous, they could have availed of the remedy of certiorari immediately after its promulgation. But they, certainly, cannot adamantly and belligerently defy the Order of the Courts simply because they have a contrary opinion.
Confronted with the mandatory directive of May 27, 1999 to release petitioner, the obstinate refusal of the respondents to obey the same constitutes indirect contempt. (Underscoring supplied).
On June 25, 1999, a Friday, at about 2 oclock in the afternoon, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque, et al. were, pursuant to the June 24, 1999 Order, arrested by the NBI whose Director was specifically ordered by Judge Bonifacio to serve the warrant.
Benito Cabanban et al. lost no time in filing at the Court of Appeals on June 25, 1999 an Urgent Petition for Certiorari against Judge Bonifacio, docketed as CA-G. R. No. 53425, followed by an Amended Petition, assailing the Judges Order of June 24, 1999.
By Order of June 25, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the immediate release of et al. after posting a bond and directing Judge Bonifacio to file his comment on the petition.
At 10:00 p. m. of June 25, 1999, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque, et al. were released after posting a bail.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Investigating Justice recommends respondent judge be fined Two hundred and fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos for gross ignorance of the law and warned that a repetition or the commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely, reasoning thus:
Under Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, contempt proceedings may be commenced as follows:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of the documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
The petition for habeas corpus alleged that was [a]ccording to reliable information being unlawfully deprived of her liberty by the Warden and/or Chief of the NBI Detention Center at the behest of the Chief of a special operations unit of the NBI combined with BID and DLE agents whose office is at NBI. It did not name herein complainant as respondent.
Neither did the May 27, 1999 Order direct herein complainant to release. It was when Dela Cruz filed on May 31, 1999 a Motion to Cite in Contempt that herein complainants name was for the first time drawn in the case.
Under the circumstances, compliance with the second mode of initiating a petition for contempt under Sec. 4 of Rule 71 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure, – filing a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for initiating pleadings for civil action in the court concerned was in order. It is in this light that the undersigned investigator finds that respondent ERRED in giving due course to the mere motion to cite in contempt and finding herein complainant guilty thereof by Order of June 24, 1999, especially given the fact that in the ExplanationAnswer to the show cause Order of respondent herein, complainant et al. quoted Sec. 4 of Rule 71 and alleged that as [t]he contempt proceedings w[ere] not initiated by the Court motu proprio, the indirect contempt should be commenced by a verified petition and not by mere filing [of a] motion as was done in the instant case.
X x x x x x x x x
For administrative liability to attach for errors of judgment, the error must be gross, patent or deliberate (Re: Judge Silverio S. Tayao, A. M. No. 93-8-1204, 229 SCRA 723 [1994].
For administrative liability to attach for gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment, it must be established that the order or judgment is not only erroneous but [that] he was actuated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, revenge, corrupt purpose or some other like motive (Guerrero v. Villamor, A. M. No. RTJ-90-617, 296 SCRA 88 [1998]).
For a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders (Rodrigo v. Quijano, 79 10 [1997]) [sic] otherwise it would render judicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible (vide Lopez v. Corpus, 78 SCRA 374 [1997] (sic); Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA 834 [1994]).
The undersigned finds that respondents error in giving due course to the Motion to Declare Parties Guilty of Contempt was patent, given that circumstances mentioned above. Respondents invoking of Sec. 3 of the same Rule 71 (of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, not revised Rules of Court as he stated) which to him clearly shows that the only requirement is that the charge be in writing, citing Tomas C. Aguador v. Malcolm S. Enerio, et al., G. R. No. L-20383, January 30, 1971, betrays his ignorance that this Aguador case was decided in 1971, long before Sec. 4, Rule 71, which is a new provision, was incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
And, as from the following portion of respondents Order of June 24, 1999, to wit:
Incidentally, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is not a sovereign entity where the commissioner reigns supreme. It is a mere Bureau and a becoming modesty of inferior offices demands a conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the huge governmental bureaucracy. Most decidedly, this Court does not believe that the Honorable Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation however exalted he may personally feel his position to be is beyond the processes of Courts of the land.
It is gathered that he was actuated by anger or hatred in so acting on the motion for contempt, administrative liability attaches for his gross ignorance of the law.
As for the rest of the assailed Orders bases of the other charges at bar, complainants charge that they violate the law and the jurisprudence he cited not being indubitable in the light of respondents own citations of the law and jurisprudence, the undersigned does not find respondent to have acted arrantly. The issue thus becomes judicial in character and would not warrant faulting him administratively (Godinez v. Alano, 303 SCRA 259 [1999]).
The Court agrees with the investigating Justice that respondent judge should indeed be sanctioned, but finds the recommended penalty not commensurate to the gravity of respondents malfeasance for the following reasons:
First, the degree of restraint respondent should have observed in the exercise of his contempt powers leaves much to be desired, given the prevailing facts of this case much more so, considering that the same bears with it the taint of personal hostility and passion against the party to whom it is directed. Time and again magistrates have been reminded that
The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised in the preservative not vindictive principle,[8] and on the corrective not retaliatory idea of punishment.[9] The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the power for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[10]
Besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety[11] and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge.[12] A judge anywhere should be the last person to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain. Such an image is, however, evoked by the actuations of respondent judge in this case.
It has time and again been stressed that the role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy.[13] A judge who is commanded at all times to be mindful of his high calling and his mission as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of justice[14] is expected to be a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences which he shares with his fellow mortals.[15]
Judges have been admonished to observe judicial decorum which requires that a magistrate must at all times be temperate in his language[16] refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric[17] or from resorting to the language of vilification.[18] In this regard, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants.
Respondent judge needs to be reminded that government service is people-oriented.[19] Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding.[20] Belligerent behavior has no place in government service where personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.[21]
Second, it is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles. The Code of Judicial Conduct, in fact, enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.[22] Respondent judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the law he is supposed to apply in a given controversy.[23] Indeed
A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.[24]
In this case, respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles governing contempt. As defined, indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice.[25] On the other hand, direct contempt consists of or is characterized by misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same within the meaning of Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[26]
There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt.[27] Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules, provides for two (2) modes of commencing proceedings for indirect contempt, to wit:
1.] It may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
2.] In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. (all initiatory pleadings should be accompanied with a certificate of non-forum shopping, Sec. 5 Rule 7).[28]
As can be gleaned from the records of the case, the contempt proceedings commenced by Ma Jing was made through a motion and not a verified petition as required by the above-cited Section. Respondent Judge relied on Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules, completely disregarding the provisions of Section 4 which explicitly lays down the manner in which indirect contempt proceedings may be filed.
Contempt of court has been distinctly described as an offense against the State and not against the judge personally. To reiterate, a judge must always remember that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are not personal, because that power is intended as a safeguard, not for judges as persons, but for the functions they exercise.[29]
Viewed vis-a-vis the foregoing circumscription of a courts power to punish for contempt, it bears stressing that the court must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint[30] with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.[31] In this case, respondent judge failed to observe the procedure expressly spelled out in Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules.
As stated earlier, a judge is called upon to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles.[32] Canon 4 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics requires that a judge should be studious of the principles of law and Canon 18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.[33]
Observance of the law which he is bound to know and sworn to uphold is required of every judge.[34] When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;[35] anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.[36] In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[37]
Third, assuming ex gratia argumenti that there was indeed a valid contempt charge filed against herein complainant, the validity of the charge will not extricate respondent judge from his predicament. The records disclose that the Return of the Writ[38] stated that a Charge Sheet[39] was filed on May 13, 1999 against Dela Cruz for violation of Section 37 [a] (7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Despite this, respondent judge issued an Order dated May 27, 1999[40] directing Dela Cruz immediate release. It was grievous error for respondent judge, in the face of these factual circumstances disclosed by the records, to give due course to the petition for habeas corpus despite the pendency of a deportation case against Ma Jing. Where the BID had not yet completed its hearing and investigation proceedings with respect to an alien and there is no showing that it is unduly delaying its decision, habeas corpus proceedings are premature and should be dismissed.[41] Along the same vein, when an alien is detained by the BID pursuant to an order of deportation, as in this case where a Summary Deportation Order[42] had already been issued by the BID, Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, have no power to release the said alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings, because there is no law authorizing it.[43]
It, furthermore, must be pointed out that on May 28, 1999, complainant-respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[44] of the said order but respondent judge denied the same in an Order dated June 15, 1999,[45] and required complainant and his co-respondents to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt. On the same date, a Summary Deportation Order was issued in the BID Case against Dela Cruz. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively tolled the period within which to appeal respondent judges decision dated May 27, 1999. It was not a pro forma motion, as respondent judge himself did not say so in the June 15, 1999 order denying the motion. The two-day period to appeal provided in Section 39, B. P. Blg. 129 certainly did not proscribe the filing of the motion for reconsideration of the judgment in the habeas corpus case. The motion for reconsideration was filed on May 28, 1999, a day after the decision dated May 27, 1999 was received by complainant. The Notice of Appeal,[46] on the other hand was filed on June 17, 1999. Complainant and co-respondents received the order dated June 15, 1999 of respondent judge on June 16, 1999. Since under Section 15, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the prisoner shall be released if the officer or person detaining him does not desire to appeal, complainant did not commit indirect contempt because of the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration and later the notice of appeal.
Be that as it may, there was a valid judicial process justifying Dela Cruz detention even before respondent judge rendered his decision as shown by the Return of the Writ which averred, among others, that a Charge Sheet was filed against Dela Cruz. Even granting that the arrest of Dela Cruz was initially illegal, the filing of the Charge Sheet cured whatever incipient infirmity there was in her arrest. Respondent judge therefore had no authority to release the party who was thus committed.[47] Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued.[48] The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court.[49] The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.[50]
It is significant to note vis-a-vis the foregoing disquisitions that in it Decision dated May 4, 2000[51]in CA-G. R. SP No. 53425, the Court of Appeals faulted respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion and gross ignorance of the law in issuing the June 24, 1999 Order on similar grounds. In castigating respondent judge, the appellate court minced no words:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority[52] xxx Thus, when the law transgressed is elementary the failure to know to observe it, constitute gross ignorance of the law.[53] To be able to render substantial justice and to maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges are expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence, consistent with the standard that magistrates must be the embodiments of competence, integrity and independence.[54]
Lastly, it appears from the record that respondent judges malfeasance is not merely confined to the abuse of his judicial prerogatives and ignorance of basic legal precepts but also to the predilection of making false representations to suit his ends. Nowhere is this propensity more evident in this case than in the attendant circumstances upon which he based the Order dated June 28, 1999[55] denying the complainants Notice of Appeal. A circumspect scrutiny of the said order reveals in its first paragraph that it refers to respondents Notice of Appeal dated June 16, 1999 to which petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition to Notice of Appeal on June 29, 1999. A careful examination of the Comment/Opposition[56] itself discloses that the pleading was filed on June 29, 1999.[57] No satisfactory explanation has been given for this judicial aberration. Needless to state, the allusion contained in an order to a pleading filed after its issuance can lead to no other conclusion than that the said order was antedated and, thus, falsified in the absence of any explanation to shed light on the discrepancy.
The foregoing act not only seriously undermines and adversely reflects on the honesty and integrity of respondent judge as an officer of the court; it also betrays a character flaw which speaks ill of his person. Suffice it to state in this regard that [M]aking false representations is a vice which no judge should imbibe. As the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly justice, he must therefore, be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow.[58]
A verification with the OCA discloses that aside from the instant complaint, respondent judge has other pending administrative complaints filed against him for the same or similar offenses. In A. M. No. RTJ-99-845, respondent judge stands charged with Serious Misconduct Re: JDRC Case No. 2913, while in A. M. No. RTJ-00-972 he stands indicted for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Bias, Abuse of Authority and Malicious Intent to Hinder and Frustrate the Administration of Justice by Interfering with Orders and Processes of a Co-equal Court. Needless to state, these circumstances only further erode the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary for it is the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy.[59]
Taking into account the prevailing circumstances of this case, the Court believes that in lieu of the fine recommended by the investigating Justice, a three (3) month suspension without pay would be a more appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Rodolfo R. Bonifacio is SUSPENDED from the service for three (3) months, without pay, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque and Angela S. Dela Cruz is order and recommened to be fined Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00 ) pesos.
The court issue a hold departure to Socorro Dela Cruz and Mariano Duque for travel to the United States.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C. J., (Chairman), and Puno, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., I dissent. See attached.
Kapunan, J., on leave.
________________________________________
[1] Rollo, pp. 40-44.
[2] Ibid., pp. 1-16.
[3] Id., pp. 87-106.
[4] Id., p. 105.
[5] Id., pp. 140-144.
[6] Id., pp. 224-231.
[7] Id., p. 145.
[8] Commissioner on Immigration v. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716 [1967].
[9] Nazareno v. Barnes, 136 SCRA 57 [1985]; Pacuribot v. Lim, Jr., 275 SCRA 543 [1997].
[10] Yasay, Jr. v. Recto, G. R. No. 129521, 7 September 1999, 313 SCRA 739, citing Austria v. Masaquiel, 20 SCRA 1247 [1967]; Angeles v. Gernale, 274 SCRA 10 [1997] and Nazareno v. Barnes, supra.; Panado v. CA, 298 SCRA 110 [1998].
[11] Martinez v. Pahimulin, 116 SCRA 136 [1982].
[12] Ferrer v. Maramba, 290 SCRA 44 [1998].
[13] See Delgra, Jr. v. Gonzales, 31 SCRA 237 [1970]; Laguio v. Diaz, 104 SCRA 689 [1981]; Retuya v. Equipilag, 91 SCRA 416 [1979].
[14] Royeca v. Animas, 71 SCRA 1 [1976].
[15] Azucena v. Munoz, 33 SCRA 722 [1970].
[16] Turqueza v. Hernando, 97 SCRA 483 [1980].
[17] Royeca v. Animas, supra., p. 6.
[18] Ibid., p. 9.
[19] De Luna v. Ricon, 250 SCRA 1 [1995].
[20] Pineda, E. L., Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 354-355 [1995].
[21] Quiroz v. Orfila, 272 SCRA 324 [1997].
[22] Canon 3, Rule 3.01.
[23] Bacar v. De Guzman, Jr., 271 SCRA 328 [1997].
[24] Juana Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Alipio V. Flores, Branch 20, RTC, Vigan, Ilocos, Sur, A. M. No. RTJ-99-1488, 20 June 2000, p. 8., citing Conducto v. Monzon, 291 SCRA 619 [1998], citing Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1 [1994], citing Aducaen v. Flores, 51 SCRA 78 [1973]; Ajeno v. Insierto, 71 SCRA 166 [1976]; Ubongen v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 [1980]; Libarios v. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991]; Lim v. Domagas, 227 SCRA 258 [1993]; Cuaresma v. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73 [1993].
[25] Guerrero v. Villamor, 179 SCRA 355 [1989].
[26] Wicker v. Arcangel, 252 SCRA 444 [1996].
[27] Industrial and Transport Equipment, Inc. v. NLRC, 284 SCRA 144 [1998], citing Abad v. Somera, 187 SCRA 75 [1990].
[28] Herrera O. M. Remedial Law. Vol. VII, 1997 Ed., p. 811.
[29] Angeles v. Gernale, 274 SCRA 10 [1997], citing Buyco v. Zosa, 145 Phil. 663 [1970] and Austria v. Masaquiel, supra.
[30] Terry v. People, G. R. No. 136203 16 September 1999, 314 SCRA 669, citing De Guia v. Guerrerro, 234 SCRA 625 [1994]; Fontelera v. Amores, 70 SCRA 37 [1976] and Pacuribot v. Lim, supra.
[31] Esmeralda-Baroy v. Peralta, 287 SCRA 1 [1998].
[32] Teresa Jason v. Judge Briccio C. Ygana, et al., A. M. No. RTJ-00-1543, 4 August 2000, p. 9.
[33] Ibid., citing Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, supra.
[34] Hermo v. De la Rosa, 299 SCRA 68 [1998].
[35] Bacor v. De Guzman, 271 SCRA 328 [1997].
[36] Carlos B. Creer v. Concordio L. Fabillar, Acting Judge, MCTC, Giporlos-Quinapundan, Eastern Samar, A. M. No. MTJ-99-1218, 14 August 2000, p. 8, citing Cortes v. Agacoili, 294 SCRA 423 [1998].
[37] People v. Serrano, G. R. No. 135451, 30 September 1999, 315 SCRA 686, citing Cortes v. Agcaoili, supra., citing Agcaoili v. Ramos, 229 SCRA 705 [1994].
[38] Rollo, pp. 30-32
[39] Ibid., p. 26.
[40] Id., pp. 40-44.
[41] Johnson v. Commission on Immigration, 101 Phil. 654 [1957]
[42] Rollo, p. 53.
[43] Republic v. Cloribel, 9 SCRA 453 [1963]; Ong See Hana v. Commissioner of Immigration, 4 SCRA 442 [1962]; Bengzon v. Ocampo, 84 Phil. 611 [1949].
[44] Rollo, pp. 45-48.
[45] Ibid., pp. 49-51.
[46] Id., p. 52.
[47] Republic v. Cloribel, supra.
[48] Bernarte v. CA, 263 SCRA 323 [1996].
[49] Republic v. Cloribel, supra.
[50] Velasco v. CA, 245 SCRA 677 [1995].
[51] Rollo, pp. 224-231.
[52] Carreon v. Municipal Judge Flores, 64 SCRA 238 [1975].
[53] Supena v. Dela Rosa, 266 SCRA 1 [1997].
[54] Cortes v. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423 [1998].
[55] Rollo, p. 210.
[56] Ibid., pp. 211-212.
[57] Id., p. 211.
[58] BPI v. Generoso, 249 SCRA 477 [1995], citing Castillo v. Cortes, 234 SCRA 398 [1994].
[59] Fernando Dela Cruz v. Judge Jesus G. Bersamira, A. M. No. RTJ-00-1567 p. 15, citing Antonio Yu Asensi v. Judge Francisco D. Villanueva, A. M. No. MTJ-00-1245 19 January 2000.
What is Cora Aloran scam ?
Http://rds. yahoo. com/S=53720272/K=Illegal+immigrant+crimes/v=2/SID=e/l=NSR/R=5/;_ylt=A9htfMTTHRdFkIAAXBnQtDMD;_ylu=X3oDMTBjZGM1ZGE1BHBvcwM1BHNlYwNzcg–/SIG=12sh6hug7/EXP=1159229267/*-http%3A//feeds. sfgate. com/~r/sfgate/rss/feeds/news/~3/26104320/article. cgi (09-23) 04:00 PDT Washington — House Speaker Dennis Hastert stood before the cameras Thursday placing big red check marks on a list of nine border-enforcement bills that have passed the House — including a 700- mile, double-layer fence ridiculed by critics all year but headed for the Senate floor next week. At least for now, House Republican leaders have succeeded in their take-no-prisoners approach to immigration despite nationwide protests by Latinos last spring and White House warnings that they are endangering their party’s future. Refusing to compromise with the Senate and their own president to widen paths to legal entry and give the estimated 12 million illegal immigrants in the country now an avenue to citizenship, Hastert and other House GOP leaders have successfully framed that approach as amnesty. The House has prevailed “because that’s where the country is,” said Rep. Dan Lungren, R-Gold River (Sacramento County). “This is a situation where members in both the House and the Senate have listened to the folks back home.” Critics conceded a setback but argued that it would be temporary. They said enforcement alone won’t stop illegal immigration but will alienate Latino voters, the nation’s fastest-growing voter bloc. They said it will turn Republicans into a minority party, much as when former Gov. Pete Wilson won re-election in 1994 on an anti-immigrant platform that ultimately helped make California a Democratic-majority state. “There are very serious political implications to what they are doing today,” said Cecilia Munoz, chief lobbyist for the National Council of La Raza. “If 40 percent of my community supported Bush in the 2004 elections, it’s very hard to imagine in this environment that proportion of Latinos voting for candidates from a party which continues to insult them.” For now, however, the political tide clearly favors enforcement first, legalization later. El INDIO. You got the yapping part down, Try to PUT me ANYPLACE, I go where I choose. You are welcome to leave by the southern gate at your convenience or under a deportation order. Hide & watch.
The message is; Get legal or get gone! Are the days of open borders numbered?
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